

Meaning in mathematics

–or– Belief as Irrefutability

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Goal Supply meaning for higher math
by defining heuristics to learn truth.

Start with how skeptical computer scientists
imagine knowledge accumulates.

Generalize to how physicists/scientists imagine
knowledge accumulates.

Seek heuristics for mathematical intuition.

Knowledge as sets of facts

Crow Arithmetic. (how many farmers are in the barn)

$$0 + 1 = 1 \quad 1 + 1 = 2 \quad 2 + 1 = 3 \quad 3 + 1 = 4$$

$$4 - 1 = 3 \quad 3 - 1 = 2 \quad 2 - 1 = 1 \quad 1 - 1 = 0$$

this is static hard-wired knowledge

Learning as deduction

Presburger Arithmetic.

$$\frac{}{0 \neq x + 1} \qquad \frac{x + 1 = y + 1}{x = y} \qquad \frac{}{x + 0 = x}$$

$$\frac{}{(x + y) + 1 = x + (y + 1)} \qquad \frac{P(0) \quad P(x) \implies P(x + 1)}{P(y)}$$

$$\frac{}{(0 + 1) + (0 + 1) = ((0 + 1) + 1) + 0} \qquad \frac{}{\text{“}1 + 1 = 2 + 0\text{”}}$$

$$\frac{}{(0 + 1) + (0 + 1) = (0 + 1) + 1} \qquad \frac{}{\text{“}1 + 1 = 2\text{”}}$$

A maximal deductive theory

Peano Arithmetic. (now with quantifiers)

...first order equational logic...

$$\overline{0 \neq x + 1}$$

$$\frac{x + 1 = y + 1}{x = y}$$

$$\frac{P(0) \quad \forall x. P(x) \implies P(x + 1)}{\forall y. P(y)}$$

PA is analogy-complete among deductive systems...

Knowledge relates via analogy

Interpretation of rationals $\langle \mathbb{Q}, \leq, +, \times \rangle$ in PA.
(define addition, multiplication, division, then pairing)

$$\langle x, y \rangle = y + (x + y)(x + y + 1)/2$$

$$\text{rational}(\langle x, y \rangle) \iff y \neq 0$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{less}(\langle w, x \rangle, \langle y, z \rangle) \iff & \text{rational}(\langle w, x \rangle) \\ & \text{and rational}(\langle y, z \rangle) \\ & \text{and } wz \leq xy \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{add}(\langle w, x \rangle, \langle y, z \rangle) = \langle wz + xy, xz \rangle$$

$$\text{mult}(\langle w, x \rangle, \langle y, z \rangle) = \langle wy, xz \rangle$$

How far can deduction get us?

Far there are deduction systems into which all others can be interpreted.

(deduction = Σ_1^0 ,
and there are Σ_1^0 -complete sets)

...but not so far...

(by Gödel's 1st incompleteness theorem)

- ▶ No decidable system can explain all other deductive systems.
(Σ_1^0 -complete is beyond Δ_1^0)
- ▶ Every analogy-complete system expresses unprovable statements.
(Σ_1^0 -complete is beyond Π_1^0)

When deduction fails, Induce

But as scientists, we can **learn** such facts using the scientific method.

- (1) Make a guess / hypothesis
(here, a set of theories)
- (2) Perform an experiment
(here, deduce consequences)
- (3) Update belief in hypothesis

What is **belief**?

Meaning as falsifiability (a la Popper)

We believe what has not been falsified;
formally consider **refutation in the limit**:

Belief Change mind arbitrarily many times,
but eventually settle on disbelief when false,
and maybe vacillate indefinitely when true.

(refutable-in-the-limit = Π_2^0)

How far can science get us?

Very Far ...but first some theory...

Aside: descriptive complexity

(hierarchy picture)

Δ_1^0 : decidable

Σ_1^0 : $t_1(x)$ = “does program x halt”

Π_1^0 : $1 - t_1(x)$ = “does program x not halt”

Σ_2^0 : $t_2(x)$ = “does program $x(h_1)$ halt”
(x can make calls to h_1)

Π_2^0 : $1 - t_2(x)$ = “does program $x(h_1)$ not halt”

\vdots

Δ_ω^0 : $d_\omega(x, n) = t_n(x)$

Σ_ω^0 : $t_\omega(x)$ = “does program $x(d_\omega)$ halt”

\vdots

Δ_1^1 : “infinity”

Π_1^1 : $T_1(x)$ = “does $x(s)$ halt on every stream s ”

\vdots

How far can deduction get us?

Far there are deduction systems into which all others can be interpreted.
(deductive = Σ_1^0 ,
and there are Σ_1^0 -complete sets)

...but not so far...

- ▶ No decidable system can explain all other deduction systems.
(Σ_1^0 -complete is beyond Δ_1^0)
- ▶ Every analogy-complete deductive system expresses unprovable statements.
(Σ_1^0 is not closed under complement)

How far can science get us?

Far there are refutation systems into which all others can be interpreted.
(refutable = Π_1^1 ,
and there are Π_1^1 -complete hypotheses)

...but not so far...

- ▶ No refutable theory can explain all other refutation systems.
(Π_1^1 -complete is beyond Δ_1^1)
- ▶ Every analogy-complete refutable theory expresses unrefutable statements.
(Π_1^1 is not closed under complement)

Aside: implications for physics

physically meaningful = falsifiable
= refutable in the limit = Π_2^0 -testable
 $\implies \Delta_1^1$ predictions

But there is no Δ_1^1 -complete theory.

hence, No GUTs:

every theory is either incomplete or non-physical
(expresses physically meaningless statements)

or maybe: there is no coordinate-free GUT

What I am doing...

Asking ...

...So Δ_1^1 sets are meaningful, right?

Can we **learn** them? (in any sense)

How does step (1) work, in the Scientific Method? (making a guess)

from Proof systems to Belief systems

formalizing...

Proof Systems $\langle \mathbb{T}, \mathbf{T}_0, +, \text{con} : \Pi_1^0, \vdash : \Sigma_1^0 \rangle$

(lattice picture)

Belief Systems $\langle \mathbb{T}, \mathbf{T}_0, +, \text{sensible} : \Pi_2^0, \models : \Pi_1^1 \rangle$

...completion, limits, forcing...

Science is possible

Theorem

*For any Δ_1^1 set (of statements) X ,
there is an unambiguous belief system whose limit is X .*

Theorem

*There is an ambiguous belief system
whose limits are uniformly Π_1^1 -complete.*

Science is tough

Theorem

Step (1) of the scientific method is as hard as it gets (Δ_1^1 -hard).

Proof.

If we had a method of guessing, we could construct a limit with only Π_2^0 -much more effort.



Heuristics to learn truth

Hope, à la Occam and Popper:
assume **simple** statements
that have not yet been decided;
(because they are easier to test)
scrap if ever to find an inconsistency; and
stick with the most **plausible** theory.

Problem how to balance simplicity and plausibility?
(complicated vs plausible picture)

Problem some assumptions only fail in their
lack of sensible complete extension